scripted-diff: Rename recentRejects

-BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT-
ren() { sed -i "s:\<$1\>:$2:g" $(git grep -l "\<$1\>" ./src ./test); }

ren recentRejects m_recent_rejects
-END VERIFY SCRIPT-

src/net_processing.cpp

@@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ private:
      *
      * Memory used: 1.3 MB
      */
-    CRollingBloomFilter recentRejects GUARDED_BY(::cs_main){120'000, 0.000'001};
+    CRollingBloomFilter m_recent_rejects GUARDED_BY(::cs_main){120'000, 0.000'001};
     uint256 hashRecentRejectsChainTip GUARDED_BY(cs_main);
 
     /*
@@ -1604,7 +1604,7 @@ bool PeerManagerImpl::AlreadyHaveTx(const GenTxid& gtxid)
         // or a double-spend. Reset the rejects filter and give those
         // txs a second chance.
         hashRecentRejectsChainTip = m_chainman.ActiveChain().Tip()->GetBlockHash();
-        recentRejects.reset();
+        m_recent_rejects.reset();
     }
 
     const uint256& hash = gtxid.GetHash();
@@ -1616,7 +1616,7 @@ bool PeerManagerImpl::AlreadyHaveTx(const GenTxid& gtxid)
         if (m_recent_confirmed_transactions->contains(hash)) return true;
     }
 
-    return recentRejects.contains(hash) || m_mempool.exists(gtxid);
+    return m_recent_rejects.contains(hash) || m_mempool.exists(gtxid);
 }
 
 bool PeerManagerImpl::AlreadyHaveBlock(const uint256& block_hash)
@@ -2235,7 +2235,7 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessOrphanTx(std::set<uint256>& orphan_work_set)
                 // See also comments in https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/18044#discussion_r443419034
                 // for concerns around weakening security of unupgraded nodes
                 // if we start doing this too early.
-                recentRejects.insert(porphanTx->GetWitnessHash());
+                m_recent_rejects.insert(porphanTx->GetWitnessHash());
                 // If the transaction failed for TX_INPUTS_NOT_STANDARD,
                 // then we know that the witness was irrelevant to the policy
                 // failure, since this check depends only on the txid
@@ -2247,7 +2247,7 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessOrphanTx(std::set<uint256>& orphan_work_set)
                 if (state.GetResult() == TxValidationResult::TX_INPUTS_NOT_STANDARD && porphanTx->GetWitnessHash() != porphanTx->GetHash()) {
                     // We only add the txid if it differs from the wtxid, to
                     // avoid wasting entries in the rolling bloom filter.
-                    recentRejects.insert(porphanTx->GetHash());
+                    m_recent_rejects.insert(porphanTx->GetHash());
                 }
             }
             m_orphanage.EraseTx(orphanHash);
@@ -3250,7 +3250,7 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessMessage(CNode& pfrom, const std::string& msg_type,
             std::sort(unique_parents.begin(), unique_parents.end());
             unique_parents.erase(std::unique(unique_parents.begin(), unique_parents.end()), unique_parents.end());
             for (const uint256& parent_txid : unique_parents) {
-                if (recentRejects.contains(parent_txid)) {
+                if (m_recent_rejects.contains(parent_txid)) {
                     fRejectedParents = true;
                     break;
                 }
@@ -3291,8 +3291,8 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessMessage(CNode& pfrom, const std::string& msg_type,
                 // regardless of what witness is provided, we will not accept
                 // this, so we don't need to allow for redownload of this txid
                 // from any of our non-wtxidrelay peers.
-                recentRejects.insert(tx.GetHash());
+                m_recent_rejects.insert(tx.GetHash());
-                recentRejects.insert(tx.GetWitnessHash());
+                m_recent_rejects.insert(tx.GetWitnessHash());
                 m_txrequest.ForgetTxHash(tx.GetHash());
                 m_txrequest.ForgetTxHash(tx.GetWitnessHash());
             }
@@ -3311,7 +3311,7 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessMessage(CNode& pfrom, const std::string& msg_type,
                 // See also comments in https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/18044#discussion_r443419034
                 // for concerns around weakening security of unupgraded nodes
                 // if we start doing this too early.
-                recentRejects.insert(tx.GetWitnessHash());
+                m_recent_rejects.insert(tx.GetWitnessHash());
                 m_txrequest.ForgetTxHash(tx.GetWitnessHash());
                 // If the transaction failed for TX_INPUTS_NOT_STANDARD,
                 // then we know that the witness was irrelevant to the policy
@@ -3322,7 +3322,7 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessMessage(CNode& pfrom, const std::string& msg_type,
                 // transactions are later received (resulting in
                 // parent-fetching by txid via the orphan-handling logic).
                 if (state.GetResult() == TxValidationResult::TX_INPUTS_NOT_STANDARD && tx.GetWitnessHash() != tx.GetHash()) {
-                    recentRejects.insert(tx.GetHash());
+                    m_recent_rejects.insert(tx.GetHash());
                     m_txrequest.ForgetTxHash(tx.GetHash());
                 }
                 if (RecursiveDynamicUsage(*ptx) < 100000) {
@@ -3331,21 +3331,21 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessMessage(CNode& pfrom, const std::string& msg_type,
             }
         }
 
-        // If a tx has been detected by recentRejects, we will have reached
+        // If a tx has been detected by m_recent_rejects, we will have reached
         // this point and the tx will have been ignored. Because we haven't run
         // the tx through AcceptToMemoryPool, we won't have computed a DoS
         // score for it or determined exactly why we consider it invalid.
         //
         // This means we won't penalize any peer subsequently relaying a DoSy
         // tx (even if we penalized the first peer who gave it to us) because
-        // we have to account for recentRejects showing false positives. In
+        // we have to account for m_recent_rejects showing false positives. In
         // other words, we shouldn't penalize a peer if we aren't *sure* they
         // submitted a DoSy tx.
         //
-        // Note that recentRejects doesn't just record DoSy or invalid
+        // Note that m_recent_rejects doesn't just record DoSy or invalid
         // transactions, but any tx not accepted by the mempool, which may be
         // due to node policy (vs. consensus). So we can't blanket penalize a
-        // peer simply for relaying a tx that our recentRejects has caught,
+        // peer simply for relaying a tx that our m_recent_rejects has caught,
         // regardless of false positives.
 
         if (state.IsInvalid()) {

test/functional/mempool_reorg.py

@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ class MempoolCoinbaseTest(BitcoinTestFramework):
         self.log.info("Generate a block")
         last_block = self.nodes[0].generate(1)
         # Sync blocks, so that peer 1 gets the block before timelock_tx
-        # Otherwise, peer 1 would put the timelock_tx in recentRejects
+        # Otherwise, peer 1 would put the timelock_tx in m_recent_rejects
         self.sync_all()
 
         self.log.info("The time-locked transaction can now be spent")

test/functional/p2p_permissions.py

@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ class P2PPermissionsTests(BitcoinTestFramework):
         tx.vout[0].nValue += 1
         txid = tx.rehash()
         # Send the transaction twice. The first time, it'll be rejected by ATMP because it conflicts
-        # with a mempool transaction. The second time, it'll be in the recentRejects filter.
+        # with a mempool transaction. The second time, it'll be in the m_recent_rejects filter.
         p2p_rebroadcast_wallet.send_txs_and_test(
             [tx],
             self.nodes[1],