itest: refactor testRevokedCloseRetribution
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@@ -291,4 +291,8 @@ var allTestCasesTemp = []*lntemp.TestCase{
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Name: "REST API",
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TestFunc: testRestAPI,
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},
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{
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Name: "revoked uncooperative close retribution",
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TestFunc: testRevokedCloseRetribution,
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},
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}
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@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ import (
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"github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/lnrpc"
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"github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/lnrpc/watchtowerrpc"
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"github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/lnrpc/wtclientrpc"
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"github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/lntemp"
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"github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/lntest"
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"github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/lntest/wait"
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
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@@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ import (
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// testRevokedCloseRetribution tests that Carol is able carry out
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// retribution in the event that she fails immediately after detecting Bob's
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// breach txn in the mempool.
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func testRevokedCloseRetribution(net *lntest.NetworkHarness, t *harnessTest) {
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func testRevokedCloseRetribution(ht *lntemp.HarnessTest) {
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const (
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chanAmt = funding.MaxBtcFundingAmount
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paymentAmt = 10000
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@@ -35,77 +36,38 @@ func testRevokedCloseRetribution(net *lntest.NetworkHarness, t *harnessTest) {
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// protection logic automatically. We also can't have Carol
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// automatically re-connect too early, otherwise DLP would be initiated
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// instead of the breach we want to provoke.
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carol := net.NewNode(
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t.t, "Carol",
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carol := ht.NewNode(
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"Carol",
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[]string{"--hodl.exit-settle", "--nolisten", "--minbackoff=1h"},
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)
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defer shutdownAndAssert(net, t, carol)
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// We must let Bob communicate with Carol before they are able to open
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// channel, so we connect Bob and Carol,
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net.ConnectNodes(t.t, carol, net.Bob)
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bob := ht.Bob
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ht.ConnectNodes(carol, bob)
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// Before we make a channel, we'll load up Carol with some coins sent
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// directly from the miner.
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net.SendCoins(t.t, btcutil.SatoshiPerBitcoin, carol)
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ht.FundCoins(btcutil.SatoshiPerBitcoin, carol)
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// In order to test Carol's response to an uncooperative channel
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// closure by Bob, we'll first open up a channel between them with a
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// 0.5 BTC value.
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chanPoint := openChannelAndAssert(
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t, net, carol, net.Bob,
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lntest.OpenChannelParams{
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Amt: chanAmt,
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},
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chanPoint := ht.OpenChannel(
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carol, bob, lntemp.OpenChannelParams{Amt: chanAmt},
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)
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// With the channel open, we'll create a few invoices for Bob that
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// Carol will pay to in order to advance the state of the channel.
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bobPayReqs, _, _, err := createPayReqs(
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net.Bob, paymentAmt, numInvoices,
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)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("unable to create pay reqs: %v", err)
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}
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// Wait for Carol to receive the channel edge from the funding manager.
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err = carol.WaitForNetworkChannelOpen(chanPoint)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("carol didn't see the carol->bob channel before "+
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"timeout: %v", err)
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}
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bobPayReqs, _, _ := ht.CreatePayReqs(bob, paymentAmt, numInvoices)
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// Send payments from Carol to Bob using 3 of Bob's payment hashes
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// generated above.
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err = completePaymentRequests(
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carol, carol.RouterClient, bobPayReqs[:numInvoices/2], true,
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)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("unable to send payments: %v", err)
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}
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ht.CompletePaymentRequests(carol, bobPayReqs[:numInvoices/2])
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// Next query for Bob's channel state, as we sent 3 payments of 10k
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// satoshis each, Bob should now see his balance as being 30k satoshis.
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var bobChan *lnrpc.Channel
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var predErr error
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err = wait.Predicate(func() bool {
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bChan, err := getChanInfo(net.Bob)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("unable to get bob's channel info: %v", err)
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}
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if bChan.LocalBalance != 30000 {
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predErr = fmt.Errorf("bob's balance is incorrect, "+
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"got %v, expected %v", bChan.LocalBalance,
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30000)
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return false
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}
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bobChan = bChan
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return true
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}, defaultTimeout)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("%v", predErr)
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}
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bobChan := ht.AssertChannelLocalBalance(bob, chanPoint, 30_000)
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// Grab Bob's current commitment height (update number), we'll later
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// revert him to this state after additional updates to force him to
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@@ -115,141 +77,93 @@ func testRevokedCloseRetribution(net *lntest.NetworkHarness, t *harnessTest) {
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// With the temporary file created, copy Bob's current state into the
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// temporary file we created above. Later after more updates, we'll
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// restore this state.
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if err := net.BackupDb(net.Bob); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("unable to copy database files: %v", err)
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}
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ht.BackupDB(bob)
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// Reconnect the peers after the restart that was needed for the db
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// backup.
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net.EnsureConnected(t.t, carol, net.Bob)
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ht.EnsureConnected(carol, bob)
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// Because Bob has been restarted, we need to make sure Carol has
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// remarked the channel as active after that.
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ht.AssertChannelExists(carol, chanPoint)
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// Finally, send payments from Carol to Bob, consuming Bob's remaining
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// payment hashes.
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err = completePaymentRequests(
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carol, carol.RouterClient, bobPayReqs[numInvoices/2:], true,
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)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("unable to send payments: %v", err)
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}
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bobChan, err = getChanInfo(net.Bob)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("unable to get bob chan info: %v", err)
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}
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ht.CompletePaymentRequests(carol, bobPayReqs[numInvoices/2:])
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// Now we shutdown Bob, copying over the his temporary database state
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// which has the *prior* channel state over his current most up to date
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// state. With this, we essentially force Bob to travel back in time
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// within the channel's history.
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if err = net.RestartNode(net.Bob, func() error {
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return net.RestoreDb(net.Bob)
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}); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("unable to restart node: %v", err)
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}
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ht.RestartNodeAndRestoreDB(bob)
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// Now query for Bob's channel state, it should show that he's at a
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// state number in the past, not the *latest* state.
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bobChan, err = getChanInfo(net.Bob)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("unable to get bob chan info: %v", err)
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}
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if bobChan.NumUpdates != bobStateNumPreCopy {
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t.Fatalf("db copy failed: %v", bobChan.NumUpdates)
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}
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ht.AssertChannelCommitHeight(bob, chanPoint, int(bobStateNumPreCopy))
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// Now force Bob to execute a *force* channel closure by unilaterally
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// broadcasting his current channel state. This is actually the
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// commitment transaction of a prior *revoked* state, so he'll soon
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// feel the wrath of Carol's retribution.
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force := true
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closeUpdates, _, err := net.CloseChannel(
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net.Bob, chanPoint, force,
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)
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require.NoError(t.t, err, "unable to close channel")
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_, breachTXID := ht.CloseChannelAssertPending(bob, chanPoint, true)
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// Wait for Bob's breach transaction to show up in the mempool to ensure
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// that Carol's node has started waiting for confirmations.
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_, err = waitForTxInMempool(net.Miner.Client, minerMempoolTimeout)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("unable to find Bob's breach tx in mempool: %v", err)
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}
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// Here, Carol sees Bob's breach transaction in the mempool, but is waiting
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// for it to confirm before continuing her retribution. We restart Carol to
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// ensure that she is persisting her retribution state and continues
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// watching for the breach transaction to confirm even after her node
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// restarts.
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if err := net.RestartNode(carol, nil); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("unable to restart Carol's node: %v", err)
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}
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// Here, Carol sees Bob's breach transaction in the mempool, but is
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// waiting for it to confirm before continuing her retribution. We
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// restart Carol to ensure that she is persisting her retribution state
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// and continues watching for the breach transaction to confirm even
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// after her node restarts.
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ht.RestartNode(carol)
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// Finally, generate a single block, wait for the final close status
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// update, then ensure that the closing transaction was included in the
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// block.
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block := mineBlocks(t, net, 1, 1)[0]
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breachTXID, err := net.WaitForChannelClose(closeUpdates)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("error while waiting for channel close: %v", err)
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}
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assertTxInBlock(t, block, breachTXID)
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block := ht.MineBlocksAndAssertNumTxes(1, 1)[0]
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ht.Miner.AssertTxInBlock(block, breachTXID)
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// Query the mempool for Carol's justice transaction, this should be
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// broadcast as Bob's contract breaching transaction gets confirmed
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// above.
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justiceTXID, err := waitForTxInMempool(net.Miner.Client, minerMempoolTimeout)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("unable to find Carol's justice tx in mempool: %v", err)
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}
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time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
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justiceTXID := ht.Miner.AssertNumTxsInMempool(1)[0]
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// Query for the mempool transaction found above. Then assert that all
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// the inputs of this transaction are spending outputs generated by
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// Bob's breach transaction above.
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justiceTx, err := net.Miner.Client.GetRawTransaction(justiceTXID)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("unable to query for justice tx: %v", err)
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}
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justiceTx := ht.Miner.GetRawTransaction(justiceTXID)
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for _, txIn := range justiceTx.MsgTx().TxIn {
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if !bytes.Equal(txIn.PreviousOutPoint.Hash[:], breachTXID[:]) {
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t.Fatalf("justice tx not spending commitment utxo "+
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"instead is: %v", txIn.PreviousOutPoint)
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}
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require.Equal(ht, breachTXID[:], txIn.PreviousOutPoint.Hash[:],
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"justice tx not spending commitment utxo")
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}
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// We restart Carol here to ensure that she persists her retribution state
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// and successfully continues exacting retribution after restarting. At
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// this point, Carol has broadcast the justice transaction, but it hasn't
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// been confirmed yet; when Carol restarts, she should start waiting for
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// the justice transaction to confirm again.
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if err := net.RestartNode(carol, nil); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("unable to restart Carol's node: %v", err)
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}
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// We restart Carol here to ensure that she persists her retribution
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// state and successfully continues exacting retribution after
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// restarting. At this point, Carol has broadcast the justice
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// transaction, but it hasn't been confirmed yet; when Carol restarts,
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// she should start waiting for the justice transaction to confirm
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// again.
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ht.RestartNode(carol)
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// Now mine a block, this transaction should include Carol's justice
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// transaction which was just accepted into the mempool.
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block = mineBlocks(t, net, 1, 1)[0]
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block = ht.MineBlocksAndAssertNumTxes(1, 1)[0]
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// The block should have exactly *two* transactions, one of which is
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// the justice transaction.
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if len(block.Transactions) != 2 {
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t.Fatalf("transaction wasn't mined")
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}
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justiceSha := block.Transactions[1].TxHash()
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if !bytes.Equal(justiceTx.Hash()[:], justiceSha[:]) {
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t.Fatalf("justice tx wasn't mined")
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}
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require.Len(ht, block.Transactions, 2, "transaction wasn't mined")
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assertNodeNumChannels(t, carol, 0)
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justiceSha := block.Transactions[1].TxHash()
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require.Equal(ht, justiceTx.Hash()[:], justiceSha[:],
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"justice tx wasn't mined")
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ht.AssertNodeNumChannels(carol, 0)
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// Mine enough blocks for Bob's channel arbitrator to wrap up the
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// references to the breached channel. The chanarb waits for commitment
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// tx's confHeight+CSV-1 blocks and since we've already mined one that
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// included the justice tx we only need to mine extra DefaultCSV-2
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// blocks to unlock it.
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mineBlocks(t, net, lntest.DefaultCSV-2, 0)
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ht.MineBlocks(lntest.DefaultCSV - 2)
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assertNumPendingChannels(t, net.Bob, 0, 0)
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ht.AssertNumPendingForceClose(bob, 0)
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}
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// testRevokedCloseRetributionZeroValueRemoteOutput tests that Dave is able
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@@ -72,12 +72,6 @@ var allTestCases = []*testCase{
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name: "switch offline delivery outgoing offline",
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test: testSwitchOfflineDeliveryOutgoingOffline,
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},
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{
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// TODO(roasbeef): test always needs to be last as Bob's state
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// is borked since we trick him into attempting to cheat Alice?
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name: "revoked uncooperative close retribution",
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test: testRevokedCloseRetribution,
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},
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{
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name: "revoked uncooperative close retribution zero value remote output",
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test: testRevokedCloseRetributionZeroValueRemoteOutput,
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