In this commit, we fix an existing grouting leak within the contract
court package. If a goroutine dies, but it doesn’t actually cancel the
block epoch notification that it requested, then it’s possible to leak
thousands of gorutines. To remedy this situation, we ensure that we’ll
*always* cancel the epoch notification once the goroutine has exited.
In this commit, we fix an existing bug that would result in some
payments getting “stuck”. This would happen if one side restarted
before the channel was fully locked in. In this case, since upon
re-connection, the link will get added to the switch with a *short
channel ID of zero*. If A then tries to make a multi-hop payment
through B, B will fail to forward the payment, as it’ll mistakenly
think that the payment originated from a local-subsystem as the channel
ID is zero. A short channel ID of zero is used to map local payments
back to their caller.
With fix this by allowing the funding manager to dynamically update the
short channel ID of a link after it discovers the short channel ID.
In this commit, we fix a second instance of reported “stuck” payments
by users.
In this commit, we fix an existing bug within the funding manager. A
channel barrier only needs to be create if upon startup the channel is
still pending. Otherwise, we’ll re-create the funding barrier
unnecessarily. This can lead to bugs when initiating payments between a
channels’ lock in and when it’s announced to the together network. If
during this period, a user attempts a payment, then the response won’t
be archived, as the grouting will be blocked waiting on the channel
barrier to close.
To fix this, we only re-create the barrier if the channel hasn’t been
confirmed.
This eliminates one source of reported “stuck payments”.
In this commit, we remove a server shutdown statement that was executed
after we obtained the wallet’s password from the user over RPC. This
was unnecessary as we already close the listener below. Before this
commit, users would see a weird benign error message. With these code
deletion, the message disappears.
In this commit, we fix an issue that was recently introduced to the way
we handle historical dispatches for the neutrino notifier. In a recent
change, we no return an error if we’re unable to actually find the
transaction that spends an outpoint. If this is the case, then the
outpoint is actually unspent, and we should proceed as normal.
Before this commit, if the remaining change was small enough, then it
was possible for us to generate a non-std funding transaction. This is
an issue as the txn would fail to propagate, meaning funds could
potentially be stuck in limbo if users didn't manually drop their
transaction history.
To avoid this scenario, we won't create a change output that is dusty.
Instead, we'll add these as miner fees.
Fixes#690.
In this commit, we add an additional constraint to the RPC
configuration parsing. Before this commit, it was possible to start lnd
with either RPC server listening on an external interface *without*
authentication disabled. After this commit, if a user tries to start
the RPC server listening on an external interface without any sort of
RPC authentication, then the daemon will fail to start up.
In order to reduce high CPU utilization during the initial network view
sync, we slash down the total number of active in-flight jobs that can
be launched.
A recent commit modified the mutex in the server to the read/write. In
order to further reduce contention, we’ll grab the read lock when we’re
examining get set of peers to ignore.
Before this commit, we’d unnecessarily use a write transaction within
the FetchChannelEdgesByOutpoint. This is wasteful as the function only
actually reads items from the database, and doesn’t attempt any
mutations at all.
In this commit, we fix a race condition related to the way we attempt
to query to see if an outpoint has already been spent by the time it’s
registered within the ChainNotifier. If the transaction creating the
outpoint hasn’t made it into the mempool by the time we execute the
GetTxOut call, then we’ll attempt to query for the transaction itself.
In this case, if we query for the transaction, then the block hash
field will be empty as it hasn’t yet made it into a block. Under the
previous logic, we’d then attempt to force a rescan. This is an issue
as the forced rescan will fail since it’ll try to fetch the block hash
of all zeroes.
In this commit, we fix this issue by only entering this “fallback to
rescan” logic iff, the transaction has actually been mined.
In this commit, we update all the references to
btcwallet+neutrino+gozmq included in the current build. We do this as a
number of bugs related to the bitcoind backend have been fixed.
In this commit, we fix an existing flake on Travis related to the new
set of on-chain HTLC tests. In this timing flake, Bob would broadcast
his sweeping transaction, but *mid block mining*. As a result, the
output would never be properly swept, needing an additional block to be
mined. We’ll now wait for both Bob’s sweeping transaction, and Carol’s
sweep transaction to be confirmed before we attempt our assertions.
In this commit, we fix an existing bug in the implementation of the
resolution of the htlcOutgoingContestResolver. Before this commit, we
would _always_ watch the claim outpoint. However, if this is on the
remote party’s commitment transaction, then we would end up watching
the wrong output. We’ll now properly detect this by modifying which
output we watch, based on if we have a second level transaction or not.
In this commit, we add 6 new integration tests to test the various
actions that may need to be performed when either side goes on-chain to
fully resolve HTLC’s. Many of the tests are mirrors of each other as
they test sweeping/resolving HTLC’s from both commitment transactions.
In this commit, we modify the testChannelForceClosure integration test
to account for the fact that now the HTLCs are only sent to the nursery
once they’ve fully timed out. Additionally, we now send Carol HTLCs
that she doesn’t know the preimage to, so she doesn’t attempt to sweep
them before we can actually time them out.
In this commit, we address an un accounted for case during the breach
remedy process. If the remote node actually went directly to the second
layer during a channel breach attempt, then we wouldn’t properly be
able to sweep with out justice transaction, as some HTLC inputs may
actually be spent at that point.
In order to address this case, we’ll now catch the transaction
rejection, then check to see which input was spent, promote that to a
second level spend, and repeat as necessary. At the end of this loop,
any inputs which have been spent to the second level will have had the
prevouts and witnesses updated.
In order to perform this transition, we now also store the second level
witness script in the database. This allow us to modify the sign desc
with the proper input value, as well as witness script.
Before this commit, we had the weight estimates flipped. When sweeping
w/o any delay, we’re spending a regular P2WKH output. When we’re
sweeping their CSV delayed output, we’ll using the entire to-local
script, so we need to properly account for that.
In this commit, we modify the way that notifications are dispatched
within the chainWatcher. Before we would *always* wait for an ack back
before we started to clean up he database state. This would at times
lead to deadlocks. To remedy this, we now allow callers to decide if
they want notifications to be sync or not. The only current caller that
requires this is the breach arbiter.
In this commit, we add the second level witness script to the
HtlcRetribution struct. We do this as it’s possible that we when
attempt to sweep funds after a channel breach, then the remote party
has already gone to the second layer. In this case, we’ll then need to
update our SignDesc and also the witness, in order to do that we need
this script that’ll get us pass the second layer P2WSH check.
In this commit, we add a new witness type to the set of known types.
This new type will be used when we need to sweep an HTLC that the
remote party has taken to the second level.
In this commit, we update the failure case within handleLocalDispatch
to handle locally sourced resolutions. This is the case that we send a
payment out, but before it can even get past the first hop, we need to
go to chain (may have been a cascading failure). Once the HTLC is fully
resolved, we’ll send back a resolution message, however, that message
doesn’t have a failure reason populated. To properly handle this, we’ll
send back a permanent channel failure to the router.
In this commit, we modify the interaction between the chanCloser
sub-system and the chain notifier all together. This fixes a series of
bugs as before this commit, we wouldn’t be able to detect if the remote
party actually broadcasted *any* of the transactions that we signed off
upon. This would be rejected to the user by having a “zombie” channel
close that would never actually be resolved.
Rather than the chanCloser watching for on-chain closes, we’ll now open
up a co-op close context to the chainWatcher (via a layer of
indirection via the ChainArbitrator), and report to it all possible
closes that we’ve signed. The chainWatcher will then be able to launch
a goroutine to properly update the database state once any of the
possible closure transactions confirms.
In this commit, we add the IsOurAddress field into the config of the
chain arb. With this new function closure, the chain arb is able to
detect co-op on chain closes automatically.
In this commit, we extend the chainWatcher to be able to automatically
detect co-op closes of the channel. With this change, it’s now fully
encompassed so able to detect all types of closes on-chain. We detect a
co-op close due to the sequence number being finalized, as well as
paying to us directly in a regular p2wkh-like output.
We no longer need to hand off new channels that come online as the
chainWatcher will be persistent, and always have an active signal for
the entire lifetime of the channel.
In this commit, we modify the breach arbiter to no longer require
holding a channel object directly in order to receive new notifications
about possible breaches. Instead, we’ll contact the chain arbiter to
request a new channel event subscription.
As a result of the new architecture, we no longer need to receive a
handoff once the new channel comes online, as the chainWatcher will
always be active and watching the channel until it’s been closed.
In this commit, we add a new method to allow external sub-systems to
gain an intent to receive notifications once an on-chain event happens.
This will be used in place of the old channel signals directly on the
channel state machine object in a series of follow up commits.
In this commit, we modify the construction of the channel arbitrator to
accept a pointer to an event stream from the chain watcher that’s been
assigned to that channel. As a result, we no longer need a fresh
unilateral close signal, as the one we get from the chain watcher will
*always* be up to date.
For each active channel, we’ll now create a chainWatcher instance that
will be around until the channel is fully closed on chain.
In this commit, we add a new struct to the package, the chainWatcher.
The duty of this struct is to replace the functionality that was
previously implemented by the closeObserver of each channel. Rather
than the source of notification being tied to the lifetime of a
particular object, it’s now delegated to a persistent object that will
be around for the entire lifetime of the channel (until it’s closed).
This will serve to greatly simplify the code, and eliminate a large
class of bugs.
In this commit, we add a new function that allows a caller to create a
UnilateralCloseSummary with the proper materials. This will be used
within a new sub-system to be added in a later commit to properly
dispatch notifications when on-chain events happen for a channel.
In this PR, we entirely remove the closeObserver from the channel state
machine. It was added very early on before most of the other aspects of
the daemon were built out. This goroutine was responsible for
dispatching notifications to outside parties if the commitment
transaction was spent at all. This had several issues, since it was
linked to the *lifetime* of the channel state machine itself. As a
result of this linkage, we had to do weird stuff like hand off in
memory pointers to the state machine in order to ensure notifications
were properly dispatched.
In this commit, we aim to address a lingering bug caused by a Late
Registration of a kid output from preschool to kindergarten. In this
scenario, an output is promoted, but *after* it’s target maturity
period, meaning that we won’t graduate the output until we restart. To
avoid this, we’ll now detect this case, and bump the graduation height
by one to ensure that when the new block arrives, we properly handle
the output.
In this commit, we modify the logic surrounding sweeping outputs to be
aware of the new types of outputs that the nursery is now responsible
for. Namely: incoming HTLC’s on our commitment transaction as well as
outgoing HTLC’s on the commitment transaction for the remote party. For
the latter class of HTLC, we’ll now set the lock time on the sweeping
transaction in order to satisfy the CLTV clause in the output we’re
spending.
The utxo nursery is now responsible for two additional output types:
outgoing HTLC’s on the commitment transaction of the remote party, and
second-level claim transactions that we broadcast. In this commit,
we’ve updated the NurseryReport to now include details, so users are
able to properly keep track of the status of all their pending coins.
This new field is reserved for outgoing HTLC outputs on the commitment
transaction of the remote party. These outputs don’t have a CSV delay,
but instead have an absolute maturity time.
In this commit, rather than the IncubateOutputs method taking a close
summary entirely, we now take resolutions for each possible output
type. We do this as it’s possible that each output is sent for
incubation at a different time as on-chain conditions change.
Additionally, if we get a baby output (CLTV locked transaction), we’ll
check to see if we can immediately broadcast it. Otherwise, we may
never sweep it unless a restart is attempted.
In this commit, we address a lingering TODO: before this if we had a
set of HTLC’s that we knew the pre-image to on our commitment
transaction after a restart, then we wouldn’t attempt to settle them.
With this new change, we’ll check that we didn’t already retransmit the
settles for them, and check the preimage cache to see if we already
know the preimage. If we do, then we’ll immediately settle them.
Olaoluwa Osuntokun